ister of National Defence, the Associate Minister of National Defence, and the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, was that in the circum- stances the only possible answer to the invitation was an affirmative one. The invitation was accordingly accepted and the expedition left Canada on the 27th of October.
The evidence discloses various reasons which appear to have actuated me War Committee. In view of what other Dominions had done in Abyssinia and Libya it was Canada's turn to help; Canada ought to share in the responsi- bility for garrisoning the Pacific area, just as Australia was assisting in Malaya; the military value of the reinforcement would be out of all proportion to the numbers involved; the arrival of the contingency in Hong Kong would have a great moral effect in the whole of the Far East and would reassure the Chinese as to the British intention to hold Hong Kong; the moral effect of the expedition might operate as a sensible influence for the preservation of peace there; at that juncture, in September, to gain time was beyond measure important; such an appeal from the predominant partner in the common cause could not be rejected.
I am permitted to reproduce a telegram from the War Office, of October 30, after the expedition had left:-
We are very grateful to you for despatching your contingent to Hong Kong at such short notice. We fully realize the difficulties of mobilization and of distance which have had to be overcome. The moral effect of their arrival in November will be much greater than it would have been two months later.
The terms of this telegram assist us in forming an idea of the hopes and expectations with which the request of September was sent.
It would perhaps be a possible view that the propriety of this decision by the Government is exclusively matter for consideration and discussion by Par- liament. Since, however, I am required to pass upon the question, it is my duty to say that I have no doubt the course taken by the Government was the only course open to them in the circumstances.
It was urged by Mr. Drew that the change of Government in Japan on October 16, by which a cabinet notoriously sympathetic with the Axis powers came into office, ought to have led the Canadian Government to re-examine the question of policy raised by the invitation of the United Kingdom. I had the advantage of reading a number of despatches from the Government of the United Kingdom, which I am not at liberty to reproduce, as well as a despatch from the Canadian military authorities in England, which is reproduced in part, dealing with the probabilities concerning war with Japan, and my conclusion is that, having regard to the information of which the Government was in possession, derived from the best sources of information open to them, nothing emerged before the departure of the expeditionary force on the 27th of October which could have been considered to be a justification for the withdrawal by Canada from the responsibility she had undertaken. On the contrary, the reasons which prompted the acceptance of the proposal continued to operate with possibly increasing force up to the sailing of the expedition.
The
Second, of the selection of the units for the expeditionary force. responsibility for advising the Minister of National Defence with respect to the composition of the expeditionary force devolved upon General Crerar, the Chief of the General Staff. In a communication to the Minister, in which his reasons for his recommendation are stated at large, he recommended that the Royal Rifles of Canada from Quebec and the Winnipeg Grenadiers from Manitoba should be designated. In this communication he said that a primary consideration in making the selection was "that the units selected should be efficient, well-trained battalions, capable of upholding the credit of the Dominion
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in any circumstances." He adds, "both" battalions designated "are units of proven efficiency.”
So long as the Minister's confidence in the Chief of the General Staff ined unimpaired, the Minister would not overrule such a recommendation a purely military matter; and he cannot be justly criticized for acting upon it.
It is my duty, however, to consider whether there was any error of judg- ment in General Crerar's recommendation. Nobody, of course, was in as good a position as General Crerar for arriving at a sound judgment upon the selection of the units. His decision, moreover, was not a mere expression of opinion; it was the basis of his recommendation, made upon his responsibility as the professional adviser of the Minister, upon which he expected the Minister to act and knew almost at once that he was acting. The evidence, which is dis- cussed in the Appendix, satisfies me that General Crerar's recommendation was made upon sound grounds and that he is not chargeable with any error in judgment, still less with any dereliction of duty in relation to it.
The principal criticism directed against this selection concerns certain platoon weapons which are included in the establishment of a Canadian infantry battalion, but which, before October, 1941, were not available generally for training purposes to the Canadian Active Army. General Crerar says:-
There were, however, in Canada at the time in question a number of battalions (among which were Royal Rifles and Winnipeg Grenadiers) which, although somewhat handicapped by lack of supplies of certain platoon weapons (mortars and anti-tank rifles), in my opinion were generally adequately trained to undertake defensive responsibilities such as those in prospect in Hong Kong.
He adds:-
The short supply of mortars and anti-tank rifles was general in all units of the Canadian Army and not peculiar to the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers.
This, he adds, is the natural and inevitable handicap of a country which is unprepared for war and has war brought upon it.
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If this handicap, as General Crerar describes it, from the "short supply of mortars and anti-tank rifles was to be a reason for exclusion from the expeditionary force in the case of the two battalions in question, then that reason was based upon a condition that, to repeat General Crerar's words, was general in all units of the Canadian Army and not peculiar to the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers" and must have applied equally to all such units; with the logical result of excluding all.
This ground of exclusion indeed, if a proper one, was (as is fully explained in the Appendix) applicable with still greater force to Canadian battalions generally than to the two battalions in question. In point of fact, these battalions were in a more advantageous position in respect of these weapons than the units of the army generally. The Royal Rifles had the three-inch mortar for training purposes at least as early as April, 1941. Although they had no ammunition, the mortar platoon was trained in its mechanism and use, tactically as well as otherwise. The mortar platoon of the Winnipeg Grena- diers was also trained in the mechanism and use of the same weapon; and further enjoyed the advantage of having, even before leaving for the West Indies, a number of anti-tank rifles (without ammunition) for training.
There were, moreover, solid reasons for believing that any deficiencies in training in such platoon weapons (with which General Crerar declares he was fully acquainted) could be made good before any encounter with the enemy. The evidence lends support to the expressed conviction of General Crerar and General Stuart (the present Chief of the General Staff) that this was done.
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